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Abstract: This article examines the economics of healthcare rationing. We begin with an
overview of the various dimensions across which healthcare rationing operates, or at least
has the potential to operate, in the first place. We then describe the types of economic
analyses used in healthcare rationing decision-making, with particular reference to costbenefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. We also discuss healthcare rationing in
practice, such as how economic analyses inform decisions regarding which services to
cover, and conclude by discussing various practical and conceptual challenges that may
arise with economic analyses and that span both economics and ethics.
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Another article in this volume discussed various ethical considerations surrounding the
rationing of healthcare. Any study of the rationing of goods and services, however, would
be incomplete without the consideration of economic analysis. The need for rationing in
the first instance arguably encapsulates the essence of economics itself. Though many
definitions abound, economics is often described as the study of how individuals and
agents of society allocate scarce resources among competing desires. Clearly, individuals
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cannot each acquire and consume all of the products and services that they want without
limitation. Many, if not all, goods and services must be “rationed” in some manner. In
this article, we provide a brief overview of healthcare rationing through the lens of
economic analysis.
At the outset, it is worth saying a bit about the term “rationing,” which is often
thrown around rather loosely by the media. In the broadest sense, rationing can be
interpreted as any means of limiting individuals’ consumption of products and services.
This perspective implies that prices can ration. After all, those unwilling to pay the price
for a particular good or service may be excluded from consuming or receiving it.
Moreover, the first fundamental welfare theorem of economics holds that price
mechanisms in competitive markets will, under a restrictive set of assumptions, perform
this necessary allocation of resources in a Pareto-efficient manner—that is, it would be
impossible to reallocate resources so as to make someone better off without making
another worse off. Some economists, however, have uneasy feelings about referring to
the free market’s price mechanism as a means of rationing. Rather, “rationing” is often
used as a term of art by many economists to explain any number of ways that policymakers and industry participants influence who consumes what healthcare services,
excluding from this definition the distribution of goods and services via market-clearing
forces. For the purposes of this article, we largely refer to rationing in this more limited
context.
If prices theoretically generate Pareto-efficient outcomes, one may wonder why
nonprice means of rationing are even warranted in the first place. One reason lies in the
failures of the assumptions of perfect completion inherent in the first fundamental welfare
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theorem of economics. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in depth the
various market failures in the healthcare system, it is well known that certain features of
this system cause it to deviate from the assumptions necessary to achieve Pareto
efficiency. Such sources of failure include, among others, agency costs stemming from
informational asymmetries between physicians and patients (sometimes manifesting in
“physician induced demand” of excessive services) and moral hazard in healthcare
utilization caused by third-party payment relationships. These features of healthcare
markets may contribute to supra-optimal levels of healthcare utilization that may be
crowding out spending on other nonhealth goods that likewise contribute to social
welfare. Total spending aside, such market failures may also lead to inefficient utilization
of some types of health services over others. These arguably undesirable outcomes have
motivated policy-makers and industry participants to design nonprice means of rationing
services, some of which are briefly summarized in this article.
A second reason for society’s unwillingness to rely solely on price mechanisms to
ration healthcare may arise from noneconomic considerations altogether. Even if prices
were to generate Pareto-efficient outcomes, it may not necessarily be the case that such
outcomes are ultimately desired. Economists evaluate policy issues by attempting to
maximize specified social welfare functions. The maximization calculus inherent in this
exercise need not collapse to one focused exclusively on economic efficiency, the kind of
which price competition is meant to produce. Social welfare optimization criteria can,
and often do, incorporate various distributional considerations. Metaphorically speaking,
when structuring healthcare rationing programs, we do not just care about the size of the
pie (efficiency considerations, generally); we also care about how it is sliced. This

analysis necessarily transcends economics. Key inputs into this optimization problem—
that is, how exactly do we value different distributions of the pie—derive from ethical
and philosophical considerations. Because another article in this volume deals
exclusively with the ethical side of this coin, we largely abstract away from such matters
in the discussion to follow.1
To set the stage for our review of the economics of healthcare rationing, Part I of
this article summarizes the various dimensions across which healthcare rationing
operates, or at least has the potential to operate, in the first place. We turn in Part II to a
brief review the types of economic analyses used in healthcare rationing decisionmaking, with a focus on cost-effectiveness analysis. In Part III, we discuss healthcare
rationing in practice. For instance, among other things, we examine how economic
analyses inform decisions regarding which services to cover. In Part IV, we describe
various practical and conceptual challenges that may arise with economic analyses,
challenges that span both economics and ethics. Finally, in Part V we conclude.

I. OVERVIEW OF DIMENSIONS TO HEALTHCARE RATIONING
In this section, we attempt to lay the foundation for a basic understanding of healthcare
rationing by delineating, in rather broad strokes, the types of healthcare resources that
require rationing in the first place and the different levels at which rationing operates
(e.g., macro- versus micro-level allocation decisions).

a. Types of Scarcity That May Require Rationing
Healthcare goods and services may be scarce due to financial or physical limitations.
While we have separated these two concepts, they are naturally intertwined. Financial
scarcity is perhaps self-evident. Individuals, entities, or states only have so much money

to devote to the purchase of goods and services, leading to inherent limitations on
consumption. To provide an extreme example, robotic surgical systems currently cost
upward of $2 million, rendering such devices prohibitively expensive for many
healthcare institutions.2 Physical scarcity arises in various contexts. As a paradigmatic
example, organs used in transplantation are often scarce—the need for organs far
outweighs the supply.3 Physician services are also sometimes scarce. With only so many
willing and able providers in existence (and only so many hours in the day), demand for
labor-intensive procedures is not always fully satisfied. There are concerns, for instance,
that the demand for primary care physicians cannot be met given the increasing insurance
coverage under the Affordable Care Act.4
These sources of scarcity may be absolute or relative in nature. Absolute scarcity
refers to shortages that cannot be addressed in the short term by reallocating resources,
whereas relative scarcity refers to shortages that may be addressed by shifting resources
from one use to another. For example, the shortage of organs for transplantation is a form
of absolute scarcity in that the limited supply is presently fixed, although policies could
be pursued to increase supply over time.5 In contrast, a shortage of robotic surgical
systems would be a form of relative scarcity to the extent that healthcare institutions may
shift funding priorities to purchase the equipment within the short term.6
In the balance of this article, we are primarily concerned with relative financial
scarcity: how should scarce financial resources be allocated in the short term between
competing healthcare goods and services?

b. Levels of Rationing

At the outset we would like to distinguish between efficiency considerations between
healthcare and other non-healthcare services and efficiency considerations within
healthcare.7 Indeed, the necessity of healthcare rationing manifests itself on both macro
and micro levels. With respect to the former, one must determine how many resources
should be allocated to healthcare delivery in the first instance as opposed to other services
that may likewise contribute to social welfare—for example, education. Analysts often
label this question one of allocative efficiency. At the national level, the United States
currently spends approximately 18% of its total income on healthcare, up from 7% in
1970.8 Some believe that social welfare could indeed be better served through a
reallocation of these resources to other means. Others believe that much of the healthcare
spending growth is justified by associated gains in health. The answer to this macro-level
question is undeniably complicated, and an array of policy initiatives (both implemented
and theorized) are aimed at curbing overspending in general.9
For the sake of tractability, we largely focus in this article on the more internal,
micro-level counterpart: taking the national amount of healthcare spending as given, how
do we allocate scarce healthcare resources among alternative uses—for example,
deciding which clinical treatments for which diseases should or should not be covered.
For instance, in treating patients suffering from prostate cancer, how many resources
should be dedicated to the use of surgery (prostatectomy), proton-beam therapy, or
watchful waiting by physicians (expectant management)? Analysts label this inquiry as
one bearing on technical efficiency. We now turn in Part II to an overview of the various
tools employed to guide this technical efficiency analysis.

II. ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS USED IN RATIONING HEALTHCARE

Analysts have derived several different approaches to assessing technical efficiency—
that is, to determining how competing uses of healthcare resources should be compared
with one another—the most well-known of which are called cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). These two approaches are distinct, though the
lines between them are at times blurred, as we suggest in a stylized example below.10 In
this section, we provide an overview of these tools, focusing on the latter.

a. Overview of CBA and CEA
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a rather intuitive concept—analysts quantify in monetary
terms the costs of a particular healthcare service and compare these costs with a monetary
calculation of the benefits. The healthcare service may be deemed appropriate if the
calculated benefits exceed the costs. Generally, CBA utilizes a simple alternative
decision rule known as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: “a policy should be adopted if and
only if those who will gain could fully compensate those who will lose and still be better
off.”11 To be sure, the benefits of CBA actually go beyond a technical efficiency
context—that is, beyond the question of how to allocate resources among competing
healthcare options. To the extent that it places all benefits—health and nonhealth—on a
common monetary framework (assuming that can be successfully done),12 it can also be
used to assess allocative efficiency—that is, to evaluate whether resources (e.g., land,
labor, capital) should be directed toward healthcare or non-healthcare goods and services.
A major problem with CBA relates to the difficulty associated with achieving this
monetization of benefits.13 Largely for this reason, CBAs are not commonly utilized in
healthcare settings. As such, we will place less emphasis on CBA in this article.

Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) represents the primary approach to economic
analysis of healthcare rationing. One can view CEA as effectively asking: taking as given
a particular level of healthcare spending, how do we select among two or more
alternative healthcare options to ensure that we receive the most “bang for the buck” from
the selected approach? Not immune to the difficulties associated with valuing health
benefits, CEA requires the construction of a common set of health outcomes in order to
facilitate a comparison across different types of health interventions—for example, the
number of life years gained as a result of given treatments. Comparing the ratio of the
costs associated with a particular treatment to the value of the outcome metric provides a
relative measure of the cost-effectiveness of each treatment. Lower ratios naturally entail
greater efficiency. Depending on certain choice parameters (e.g., must only one treatment
be selected or may some combination of treatments be selected) and using costeffectiveness ratios as inputs, CEA then applies certain selection criteria to identify those
health interventions that merit priority.
In perhaps the most general terms, CEA involves maximizing population health
given a fixed healthcare budget. With perfect information and foresight, the economic
framework of CEA collapses to a straightforward constrained optimization problem
where policy analysts take as given various treatments i with exogenous health
production functions hi(), prices of those treatments pi, and a healthcare budget W, and
maximize aggregate health production by choosing to employ a set j of the various health
technologies subject to the production and budgetary constraints:
max ∑ h j
j∈i

j

W ≥ ∑ h j p j

j
subject to 
hi ≤ hi ( p, W ) ∀i
CEAs are typically applied in a more simplistic fashion than this general
optimization problem entails. For instance, when multiple treatments may be selected
among a set of noncompeting alternatives, CEA often entails calculating the costeffectiveness ratio for each treatment relative to the no-treatment option (often known as
the average cost-effectiveness ratio for that treatment) and then ranking treatments from
the lowest to higher ratios (from most efficient on average to least efficient on average).
Society may then select treatments from among this rank ordering, moving down the list
until the budget is exhausted. It is important to note that the analysis may take on a form
different from this generalized optimization problem and from this stated simplification
of that problem when analysts are required to select a single treatment among a set of
mutually exclusive alternatives, or when analysts are determining whether to adopt a new
treatment on the margin to the exclusion of the status quo treatment previously adopted.
A “competing” CEA of this latter nature typically follows a particular selection process
that we demonstrate in a highly stylized example below.
Before turning to that example, however, we note that much discussion in CEA
settings bears on the selection of the necessary common measure of health benefits.
Measures employed include the number of illnesses cured, the number of lives saved, and
the number of life years gained.14 In general, this exercise faces real difficulties when
comparing the benefits of different treatments. For instance, how should one assess
patient A’s cataract surgery (to restore sight) against patient B’s anterior cruciate
ligament surgery (to restore mobility)?15 Moreover, an obvious limitation with CEA is

that the analyst must decide how to define, measure, and combine the quality dimension
and the quantity dimension.16 Economists and other health researchers have attempted to
create methods to standardize benefits—that is, methods that seek to make commensurate
quantity and quality. CEAs often employ health benefit measures that account for a
treatment’s impact on length of life (mortality) adjusted for any decrements in quality of
life due to functional limitations resulting from the treatment (morbidity), such as the
number of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) or disability-adjusted life years
(DALYs).17 Even the use of measures such as QALYs, however, comes with substantial
challenges (discussed further in Part IV), not the least of which is the lack of data
required to construct QALYs for a particular treatment.
In the stylized example below (and in the Appendix), we demonstrate how CEA
and CBA might be applied in practice.

b. Stylized Example
Consider a sixty-year-old patient who suffered from a heart attack and now faces a
hospital mortality rate of 10%.18 Suppose there are three treatment options that differ in
effectiveness and cost: (1) streptokinase, which reduces the mortality rate by 5 percentage
points to 5% and costs $200 per patient; (2) tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA), which
reduces the mortality rate by 7.5 percentage points to 2.5% and costs $2,000 per patient;
or (3) do nothing, which does not change the mortality rate and has no cost. For the
purposes of the calculations to follow, assume a relevant heart attack patient population
of 1,000.
To determine what treatment option should be adopted—assuming in this case
that only one can be adopted—a policy analyst seeking to ration costs might conduct a

simple CEA. CEAs begin by ruling out from consideration strictly dominated treatments,
that is, treatments that cost the same or more as another treatment but yielded lower
benefits. None of the three treatments in our example are strictly dominated by another.
Thereafter, the analysis orders the remaining alternatives starting from the one that
generates the lowest benefit but also costs the least to the one that costs the next highest
amount and generates the next highest benefit level, and so on and so forth. A CEA in
this “competing choice” setting essentially involves incrementally moving up this chain
and determining whether the next alternative should be chosen over the preceding
alternative in that chain. While the selection framework may be tailored to achieve
different sets of objectives, each such determination often rests on whether the
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) associated with the relevant treatment in
comparison with the status quo treatment falls below some specified threshold ratio. To
be more precise, the ICER here equals the incremental cost of the treatment in question
relative to the next-least effective treatment divided by the incremental benefit of the
treatment at question relative to the next-least effective treatment. If the ICER indeed
falls below the stated threshold—which often captures our priors regarding the value of a
unit of the indicated health outcome—that marginal treatment should be preferred over
the prior treatment and we should proceed to evaluating whether the next most effective
treatment should be adopted (using the same criteria).
Let us return to our example to demonstrate. Start from the baseline in which we
do no intervention. This costs nothing and generates no benefits. Let us then evaluate
whether we should adopt the next intervention in this chain—in this case, streptokinase.
Is it worth it to adopt this marginal intervention? To assess this, the analyst will calculate

the incremental costs and effectiveness of streptokinase versus no treatment. Using the
assumed numbers, the incremental cost for the population is $200,000, and the
incremental effectiveness is 50 individuals saved.19 Thus, the so-called ICER becomes
$4,000 per life saved ($200,000/50). If $4,000 falls below the specified threshold ICER
level—stated differently, if society is willing to accept $4,000 per avoided fatality—then
we would determine that providing streptokinase is preferred to no treatment. Assume
that we do. Next, we move on to evaluating the marginal adoption of t-PA in place of
streptokinase, which we have just established as our new status quo. Using the same
analysis we can obtain the ICER of $72,000 per life saved.20 Whether we adopt t-PA as
the sole treatment over streptokinase depends on whether $72,000 falls below the
threshold ICER level specified by the analyst.
[Insert Table 1]
To the extent that this competing choice model requires the selection of a
threshold ICER level—often meant to capture the value that society places on a unit of
the health outcome—the analysis will run into the same problems identified above for
CBA—that is, placing a monetary value on health. For this reason, we note that the
distinction between CBA and CEA may, in part, be blurred. We note, of course, that the
simple, noncompeting model described briefly in Part II(a) above—in which we exhaust
those treatments with the lowest average cost-effectiveness ratio before moving on to the
next lowest average cost-effectiveness treatment—does not always require a comparison
with a value threshold. Thus, as a more general matter, CEA faces at least fewer concerns
regarding the need to place a monetary value on healthcare outcomes.

Though our focus in this article is largely on CEA, we extend this stylized
example in the Appendix in order to demonstrate how a common formulation of CBA
would approach the choice as between streptokinase and t-PA.

III. HEALTHCARE RATIONING IN PRACTICE
As suggested in the introduction above, we define healthcare rationing in rather broad
terms to capture initiatives aimed at limiting utilization of healthcare services, other than
via price mechanisms in competitive marketplaces. To discuss the full array of ways in
which rationing takes place is beyond the scope of this modest article. Given our decision
already to focus on technical (within health) rather than allocative (between health and
nonhealth) efficiency, we focus our discussion on forms of rationing that more explicitly
incorporate CEA into decisions regarding what healthcare resources society should
prioritize. Arguably, it is precisely such types of initiatives that first come to mind when
hearing the word “rationing” anyway. We begin this discussion by describing programs
in which payers (private or public) use CEA to guide coverage decisions.

a. Covered Services
Excluding particular services from insurance coverage is a common supply-side rationing
mechanism. While denying insurance coverage does not necessarily prevent patients
from receiving desired services, treatments that are not covered—that is, reimbursed—are
perhaps substantially less likely to be utilized because patients financially internalize the
full cost of care. In some countries, determinations of services to cover are explicitly
guided by CEA. In the United Kingdom, for example, the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence (NICE) is responsible for making recommendations to the British
National Health Service (NHS) on the coverage of selected medical treatments. These

recommendations are based on the cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained for
patients and on the overall impact of the proposed covered treatment on NHS costs. It is
believed that NICE employs an implicit cost-effectiveness threshold and recommends
coverage of treatments with costs per QALY gained within or below the $30,000 to
$50,000 range.21 For example, if a treatment extends life by 0.5 QALYs, the NHS might
pay as much as $25,000 for the treatment, implying a cost-effectiveness of $50,000 per
QALY gained.
We briefly digress to note the findings of an empirical literature that estimates the
value people place on QALYs. Such valuations can provide a useful benchmark for
payers to use in guiding coverage decisions; if the cost per QALY for a particular
treatment is lower than the amount by which individuals value a QALY, such services
may be deemed worthwhile. A comparison of this nature is evidently helpful for
allocative as well as technical efficiency analyses. Depending on the method used,22
estimated dollar values of a QALY range from $74,000 to $450,000, with practitioners of
CEA tending toward the low end of the range.23
In the United States, private payers often use CEA to justify coverage decisions.
However, CEA is less well incorporated in the publicly financed portion of the U.S.
market. While some public insurers use CEA to guide coverage decisions (e.g., the
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs), the Medicaid and
Medicare programs, two of the largest health insurers in the United States, may not, by
law, consider the cost of a treatment in determining coverage.24 Yet some evidence
suggests that cost-effectiveness has played an informal role in some Medicare coverage
decisions by guiding the level of scrutiny Medicare uses when assessing new

treatments.25 With the rising burden of healthcare expenses as a percent of national
income, there is a growing movement toward formally incorporating CEA into more
public insurers coverage decisions; the outcome of this debate, however, remains
uncertain.

b. Demand-Side Initiatives
Health insurers employ an array of cost-sharing requirements—copays, coinsurance,
deductibles, and so forth—to discourage utilization of inappropriate care by patients who
do not pay the full cost of the care they receive (i.e., to alleviate moral hazard and
encourage patients to pursue cost-justified services). Such arrangements have undergone
a dramatic growth in recent years with the proliferation of high-deductible health plans
(HDHPs) that impose large deductibles on most medical services (averaging over $2,000
for individual plans and $4,000 for family plans).26 The vast literature on this topic
reveals that increases in cost-sharing reduce healthcare utilization.27 While cost-sharing
does not deny coverage of medical services (see Part III.A), its intent to discourage
utilization of healthcare in some circumstances is arguably in the same spirit. Rather than
give a full accounting of such mechanisms, we offer a brief discussion of those costsharing arrangements that have incorporated CEA-style components similar to that
summarized in Part II above, thereby falling within the narrower theme of this article.
Cost-sharing mechanisms have historically been somewhat blunt in nature—for
example, particular copayment amounts or percentages were—and still often are—
applied indiscriminately to all covered services. Over time, insurers developed more
tailored structures that attempt to place more cost-sharing pressure on some procedures
over others. A particular concern with blunt cost-sharing approaches was that they would

discourage utilization of both their intended target—clinically inappropriate care (i.e.,
where the costs of care surpass its benefits)—and an unintended target—clinically
appropriate care (i.e., where the benefits of care surpass its costs). Informational
limitations and behavioral irrationalities (e.g., hyperbolic discounting) may cause patients
to nonetheless forego valuable and cost-justified care in the face of cost-sharing
obligations.28 Common targets of concern here include chronic-care management (e.g.,
routine diabetes care), particularly within vulnerable populations.29
To address the concern that cost-sharing results in individuals foregoing clinically
beneficial care, insurers have begun to modify this blunt, traditional approach to costsharing. One increasingly popular idea is called value-based insurance design (VBID).
VBID programs promote utilization of clinically cost-effective care by lowering or even
eliminating cost-sharing for “high value” medical treatments (such as metformin for
diabetes management) and simultaneously discouraging utilization of unnecessary care
by raising cost-sharing for “low-value” treatments (e.g., lung volume reduction
surgery).30 VBID programs are more common for prescription drugs where, for instance,
generic drugs (e.g., metformin) are covered at higher rates than their more expensive
branded equivalent (Glucophage) and more effective drugs (e.g., Flovent for asthma) are
covered more generously than their less-effective counterparts (Singulair) within the
relevant drug class.31 Some VBID programs even target patients based on clinical criteria,
as the value derived from certain drugs may differ based on patient condition and
severity.32 In addition, VBID has been incorporated into HDHPs, many of which now
waive the deductible for selected types of preventive care (e.g., breast and cervical cancer

screenings, and well-child visits)33 and other treatments perceived to be of high value
(e.g., medications for chronic conditions).34
While VBID programs may consider CEAs only informally when identifying
high-value care, they focus on clinical areas with the greatest potential to improve health
outcomes and/or constrain costs, including the treatment of chronic illnesses (e.g.,
diabetes and antihypertensive medications) and secondary disease prevention (e.g., statins
that lower cholesterol).35 Early evidence suggests that such programs have been
successful at meeting this potential. For example, Chernew and colleagues evaluated the
effect of a VBID program that eliminated copays for generic drugs and reduced copays
by 50% for branded drugs in five chronic disease classes.36 They found that adherence
improved in four of the five classes by 2.6 to 4.0 percentage points. Subsequent VBID
studies have confirmed this result, reporting statistically significant though quantitatively
modest impacts that vary in magnitude across drug classes.37 The current evidence base
regarding the extent to which these improvements will translate into lower costs,
however, remains inconclusive.38

c. Provider Networks
In addition to denying full coverage or imposing differential cost-sharing amounts for
certain services, health insurers have also sought to regulate patient behavior by directing
patients to certain providers over others. Insurers often construct provider networks
associated with their plans, extending more favorable coverage to insureds who visit
providers within the network (the most common model of this approach is known as a
preferred provider organization, or PPO). To see out-of-network providers, patients

typically face higher cost-sharing. As a general matter, these plans may achieve cost
savings by negotiating favorable prices with participating in-network providers.
Falling more within the spirit of the rationing approaches emphasized in this
article (aimed at attaining technical efficiency), some provider network programs take
matters one step further (i.e., beyond mere price concessions through bargaining power)
and try to encourage patients to seek care from providers who offer greater productive
efficiency—that is, those who have proven to deliver quality care at low costs. Such
alternative approaches are known as “limited network” and “tiered network” plans.
Limited networks typically rank physicians and hospitals based on some cost and
quality measures and exclude nonpreferred providers from the network altogether.39
Tiered networks, in turn, are the network analog to VBID plans (discussed in Part III(b)
above) in that they encourage patients to seek care from preferred providers by
structuring cost-sharing differences among tiers.40 Over the past five years, limited and
tiered provider networks have become increasingly popular as the percentage of
employers whose largest plan included a limited or tiered network increased from 16% in
2010 to 23% in 2013.41
Even if provider networks can effectively steer patients toward preferred
providers, provider networks face a number of potential drawbacks. While one of the
objectives of networks is to guide patient decision-making with respect to provider
selection, such networks may disrupt long-standing existing relationships (and thus the
benefits of continuity-of-care associated with such relationships). Another issue is that
patients seeking specialty care from in-network providers with long waitlists may have
few low-cost immediate alternatives, an issue that is largely mitigated in tiered networks.

Finally, questions abound regarding the availability of sound data on provider quality. On
this point, physician groups in several states have sued health plans with provider
networks on various grounds, including defamation, interference with advantageous
relations, and violation of procedural due process, alleging that health plans are
misclassifying providers through opaque processes that employ fallible ranking methods
and rely on limited (and sometimes inaccurate) data on provider quality.42 While these
lawsuits have failed in the courts, the concerns expressed reveal some key challenges
with provider tiering. Ultimately, the evidence of the impact of limited and tiered
provider networks on utilization and cost containment is mixed though admittedly
sparse.43

IV. CHALLENGES WITH ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS
In this section, we expand our discussion of CEA to highlight several measurement,
analytic, and application challenges confronting analyses of this nature. While we discuss
these challenges in the context of CEAs that use outcome metrics that incorporate quality
of life adjustments—for example, QALYs—most of the issues generalize to other forms
of economic analysis as well.

a. Measurement Challenges
By providing a common framework to assess the benefits of competing healthcare
resources, measures such as QALYs are useful for cross-treatment comparisons, as noted
in Part II. However, there are various conceptual issues with how QALYs are
constructed. Without setting forth the full details of a QALY calculation, we note a few
such issues in this section. One concern is the fact that the quality-of-life adjustment
weights used in QALY calculations are derived from elicited utility preferences.44

Preferences, however, will likely differ across various types of groups due to various
social, cultural, or economic differences, and there is a lack of consensus over whose
preferences should be used. For example, individuals in manual labor settings may assign
greater weight to physical functional limitations than individuals in knowledge-based
occupational settings.45
Consider also the case of disabled individuals. Interestingly, disabled patients
with a given condition often report less limitation on quality of life than community
members without the condition. On the one hand, the ex ante preferences of a community
member may less accurately capture the effect of a treatment on quality of life than the ex
post informed preferences of a disabled person. But on the other hand, the ex post
preferences of disabled persons may reflect adaptation to their functional limitations, a
lowering of expectations that may provide a less acceptable basis for developing qualityof-life adjustment weights.46 Relatedly, if community member preferences (assigning
greater functional limitation to disabilities) are used in CEAs, then treatments extending
the lives of disabled individuals will receive less weight. But if CEAs rely on disabled
individual preferences (assigning less functional limitation to disabilities), then less
weight will be given to treatments preventing disability.47
Another concern relating to QALY construction regards what life expectancy
measures should be used.48 QALYs gained by an intervention effectively capture the
amount of time spent in a particular state of health that is made possible by the
intervention itself. A calculation of this sort naturally requires some estimate of the
general life expectancy facing the patient—after all, an intervention that avoids death and
returns a patient to a healthy state will not do so indefinitely. In evaluating a treatment for

individuals with a particular condition, it may seem reasonable to use the average life
expectancy for individuals with that condition. However, defining QALY gains in this
way would result in fewer QALYs gained for individuals with life-shortening disabilities,
making treatments targeting these individuals appear less cost-effective. In turn, life
expectancies also vary by socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, and gender. Some of
these differences appear largely biological in nature, while others may have been
exacerbated by unjust social conditions (e.g., between the poor and wealthy). How should
such differences factor into QALY calculations?
A final and related debate frequently invoked bears on whether QALYs should be
age-weighted. While CEAs count QALYs the same regardless of the age of the patient,
some argue that QALYs should be age-weighted to give priority to the young. One
justification, often referred to as the “fair innings” argument,49 posits that as a matter of
fairness, priority should be given to help individuals achieve a normal lifespan; the
young, who have enjoyed less of their life share, should therefore receive greater
priority.50 While some forms of preferencing may be deemed discriminatory in certain
contexts (e.g., based on race or gender), some argue that preferencing the young is not
discriminatory because everyone is young at some point, during which time they would
have received priority.51 Another rationale argues that priority should be given to QALYs
gained by adults during their working years, given that they are a primary source of
financial, emotional, and physical support for children and the elderly.52 However, one
concern with this argument is that it values the health of adults based on their
instrumental value to others.

b. Analytical Challenges

In addition to the measurement challenges described in Part IV(a), there are a variety of
issues relating to how CEAs are conducted. In this section, we discuss several such
issues. The first operational obstacle relates to the perspective from which CEAs are
conducted. Often CEAs take the viewpoint of the agent making the decision—for
example, the payer—but CEAs may also be conducted from the societal perspective.
While CEAs conducted from the payer perspective use the prices charged for a treatment
as the cost, the societal perspective includes all health benefits and costs regardless of
who receives the benefits or bears the costs. The choice of a perspective, therefore, may
have a large effect on the results of the analysis.
Consider, for example, a drug and a medical device of equal effectiveness. The
drug’s cost of production is low, but its price is high (under patent protection, it sells at a
substantial markup), whereas the medical device’s cost of production is moderate, and its
price markup is small. On these facts, the medical device may be more cost-effective than
the drug from the payer perspective because it offers equal effectiveness at a lower price
to the payer. In turn, the drug may offer greater value from the societal perspective, given
that it is less resource intensive to produce and offers equal effectiveness. Although the
payer faces a higher price for the drug, from the societal perspective this constitutes a
welfare transfer from payer to producer, not a welfare loss.53
When CEAs are used to inform coverage decisions, employing the payer
perspective may also discourage the offering of preventive care. Given the high rate at
which individuals switch health plans (“insurance churn”),54 payers have less incentive to
promote preventative care that provides future health benefits since many of the payer’s

current members will not be members in the mid/long term, even if the preventive care
would be supported from the societal perspective.
A second issue involves which costs and benefits should be taken into account in
CEA calculations. Direct health benefits and costs are always included, but should
indirect nonhealth benefits and costs be included, as well?55 An efficient allocation of
resources should indeed base its analysis on all costs and benefits stemming from the
treatments under investigation, whether indirect versus direct or health versus nonhealth
in nature. However, some object on grounds other than efficiency to the inclusion of
some items. A prime example here is smoking-cessation treatment. Such programs may
extend lives directly, but they may also tend to increase Social Security costs. Including
these indirect nonhealth costs in a CEA would result in a lower smoking prevention costeffectiveness ratio. Some view it unfair to allow a nonhealth benefit of this nature tip the
scale in favor of allocation to one patient over another, as this treats patients
instrumentally as a means to benefit others.56 Including nonhealth benefits in other
contexts raises fewer eyebrows—for example, the inclusion of enhanced worker
productivity and reduced burdens on friends and family resulting from substance abuse
treatments.
A final analytical/measurement issue related to QALYs concerns whether health
benefits that accrue to individuals in the future should be discounted.57 While future costs
are discounted to reflect the time value of money, which is appropriate, it is not clear that
health benefits should be discounted as well. Different interventions will take varying
lengths of time to yield benefits, and the discounting of health benefits could result in
greater priority for interventions that provide small benefits in the short term over

interventions that provide larger benefits in the future, including vaccine programs and
other preventive interventions. While paradoxes may arise when health benefits are not
discounted or discounted at a different rate than costs,58 an adequate ethical justification
for discounting health benefits has not been offered.

c. Application Challenges
Even assuming that the measurement and analytical challenges discussed in Parts IV(a)
and IV(b) have been adequately addressed, issues with how the results of CEAs are
applied remain. In this section, we review two issues sometimes called the “fair
chances/best outcomes problem” and the “aggregation problem.”59
The fair chances/best outcomes problem concerns rationing decisions between
two or more treatments in which allocating resources for one treatment would provide
better outcomes for a given group, but those in need of other treatments may nevertheless
claim that they should still have a fair chance to receive the resources.60 Consider the
following stylized example: Two treatments yield different levels of value, say treatment
A for condition X provides 1.00 QALY per unit of cost and treatment B for condition Y
provides 0.99 QALYs at the same cost. A strict utilitarian applying these CEA results
would conclude that the resources should be allocated to treatment A. However, most
people would conclude that the 0.01 QALY difference between treatments A and B does
not, ceteris paribus, sufficiently justify this decision. But what if treatment B provided
only 0.90 QALYs (or 0.80, 0.50, 0.20)? In several of these cases, many people may
believe that patients with condition Y (who need treatment B) have a reasonable
complaint: since the treatments are “close enough” in value, everyone deserves a fair
chance to receive the available resources.61 However, most people believe there is some

point at which the value of treatment A so outweighs the value of treatment B that
appeals to fair chances should no longer be deemed relevant. In the abstract, one proposal
to address the fair chance/best outcomes problem is the use of a weighted lottery.62 Yet
even if this approach could be operationalized, it remains unclear how far intuitions about
fair chances extend.
Second, the aggregation problem arises when modest benefits to a large number
of individuals are more cost-effective than large benefits to a small number of
individuals.63 Philosophers disagree over the propriety of aggregating benefits across
individuals in order to assess how limited resources should be allocated across different
groups. An often cited example of this issue occurred in the state of Oregon Medicaid
experiment.64 In 1989, Oregon decided to expand its Medicaid program, financing the
expansion by offering Medicaid beneficiaries a more limited set of healthcare services
chosen and ranked based on cost-effectiveness. But when Oregon published its schedule
of covered and uncovered services, dental caps for pulp exposure—providing modest
benefits to many people—were determined to be cost-effective and therefore covered,
while life-saving surgical procedures for ectopic pregnancy and appendicitis—providing
substantial benefits to fewer people—were less cost-effective and given less preferential
coverage treatment. Comparing the total benefits across these groups proved worrisome
for many observers. Controversy over these and other coverage decisions led to the
disbanding of the program.
Aside from the aggregation component per se, part of the discomfort in this
example comes in comparing treatments with modest health benefits but high costeffectiveness ratios to those with substantial health benefits but lower cost-effectiveness

ratios. One attempt to address the uneasiness appeals to the so-called “rule of rescue,”
which affords priority to less cost-effective treatments in life-or-death situations,
assuming the cost-effectiveness is not unreasonably low.65 The rule of rescue relates to
the notion that the maximand of CEAs should be saving the most lives in a more
immediate, “identifiable” sense, as opposed to extending life years in a more predicted
and “statistical” sense. Some commentators have been critical of this distinction between
identifiable lives and statistical lives, considering that any treatment that extends a
patient’s life also in a sense “rescues” that patient at some future time.66 Yet some
research suggests that individuals are willing to pay more per QALY for life-saving
treatments than for life-extending or life-enhancing treatments,67 suggesting that perhaps
some (though not absolute) weight should be given based on the type of treatment being
prioritized.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A comprehensive discussion of the economics surrounding healthcare utilization and the
means by which governments, private insurers, and market dynamics themselves may
constrain such utilization (and thus “ration” limited resources) would require far more
attention than a single article could hope to achieve. Our goals here have indeed been
more modest. We have focused on how certain tools of economics, mainly costeffectiveness analysis, have shaped distinct types of non-price-rationing practices.
Indeed, much has been omitted in our discussion regarding the numerous other ways in
which governments and private parties may regulate healthcare utilization. For instance,
while we have addressed more categorical approaches to regulating which services
patients may obtain, we have not addressed more case-by-case mechanisms that insurers

may employ—for example, utilization review. Nor have we discussed certain modern
approaches to rationing care such as global payment systems that retreat from fee-forservice reimbursement models and instead reimburse providers (either individually or in
a group) a flat fee for treating specified patients over a given period of time or during
particular episodes of care.
Structures of this latter variety—that is, alternative means of reimbursing
physicians—are worth emphasizing briefly in these concluding remarks. Our discussion
in this article largely focused on policies and programs aimed at curbing or shaping
patient decision-making. Excessive use of medical care, however, may also arise from
another source: physicians. Perhaps one of the most important features of the U.S.
healthcare system that may contribute to excessive healthcare utilization is the fee-forservice environment largely characterizing the U.S. healthcare delivery system.68 Under a
fee-for-service approach, physicians are effectively paid more for doing more, creating
incentives on the part of physicians to perform an unnecessarily high degree of services, a
phenomenon often labeled “physician induced demand.” Whether fee-for-service
reimbursement structures, in fact, cause physicians to provide an unnecessarily large
number of procedures is the subject of an extensive literature.69 While establishing
causation in such studies is empirically challenging, the most convincing evidence put
forth to date suggests that at least some physicians may indeed be inducing demand in
this manner.70 With these considerations in mind, more complete discussions regarding
healthcare cost containment and healthcare rationing cannot ignore the decision-making
role of physicians in this complex interaction between medical providers, insurers, and
patients.

APPENDIX
Return to the heart attack example in Part II, in which we evaluated the use of two
treatment interventions: streptokinase and t-PA. We now evaluate the choice between
these two interventions employing cost-benefit analysis (CBA), as opposed to costeffectiveness analysis. Assume that the baseline treatment is streptokinase, and a policymaker is deciding whether to adopt t-PA as a treatment for society, guided by CBA.
Effectively, this analysis entails calculating the monetary benefits of t-PA relative to that
of streptokinase and asking whether such relative benefits exceed the costs of t-PA
relative to streptokinase. If such net benefits are indeed greater than 0, the CBA suggests
that efficiency would be enhanced by selecting t-PA over streptokinase.
Assume that the use of t-PA results in a lower risk of death than the use of
streptokinase. How should such reduced risk of death be valued? CBAs often approach
this inquiry by calculating something known as compensating variation (CV). In this
context, CV can be thought of as the amount of money that must be taken away from the
individual in order to leave her just as well off as she was prior to the reduction in risk.
Conversely, CV can be interpreted as the maximum amount of money the patient would
be willing to pay to obtain the treatment reducing risk of death (t-PA) over the current
treatment (streptokinase).
Continuing our example, suppose a representative heart attack patient has lifetime
expected utility under treatment t of E U (Y | t )  = (1 – pt ) u (Y | live ) + pt u (Y | dead ) ,
where pt is the probability of death with treatment t . In words, conditional on obtaining
treatment t , the patient lives with probability ( 1 – pt ) and obtains a utility level

u (Y | live ) and dies with probability pt and obtains a utility level u (Y | dead ) . Let’s

denote the probably of death under streptokinase treatment as p and probability of death
under the t-PA treatment as q . Assume that u (Y | dead ) = 0 , that is, the patient gets
no utility if he or she is dead. Further assume that the patient has $100,000 in income.
Solving for CV means that we find the CV that leaves the consumer indifferent between
an income of $100,000 with a probability of death of p and an income of $100,000–CV
with a probability of death of q .
For concreteness, let’s solve a simple example by specifying a functional form for
the utility function, say, u = ln (Y ) , and assuming that Y = $100K , p = 0.05 , and

q = 0.025 .71 We can find CV = $25,562.72 In words, under the simplified example here,
the representative heart attack patient’s willingness to pay for the t-PA treatment (as
opposed to streptokinase) is $25,562, which far exceeds the monetary cost of the
procedure over streptokinase ($1,800). If the relative monetary cost of the treatment
($1,800) equals the social opportunity cost of the treatment, the decision rule from the
CBA would be to adopt t-PA as a treatment because it has positive net benefits.
Table 1. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Example
Strategy

Cost

Incremental

Effectiveness

Cost

Incremental

Cost/Effectiveness

ICER

Effectiveness

No treatment

$0

$0

900

900

$0

$0

Streptokinase

$200,000

$200,000

950

50

$211

$4,000

t-PA

$2,000,000

$1,800,000

975

25

$2,051

$72,000
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